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I. INTRODUCTION
There are now more than sixty thousand multinational corporations
operating in the world. 1 This rapidly increasing number and the
impressive global reach of corporations create connections among
individuals such that the actions of any given corporation can be
simultaneously felt all over the world. Its consumers in the west, its
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law—Bloomington. J.D.,
Harvard Law School, B.A., University of Michigan. The author would like to thank the University of
Cincinnati College of Law for hosting the symposium at which this Article was first presented, as well
as Dean Donna Nagy, Professor Bert Lockwood, and Sean Arthurs for their invitation to participate
therein. In addition, she would like to express sincere gratitude to the following colleagues for their
insightful comments at various stages of this Article’s completion: Alfred Aman, Hannah Buxbaum,
David Fidler, Luis Fuentes-Rowher, Ajay Mehrotra, David Weissbrodt, Cynthia Williams, Susan
Williams, and Elizabeth Zoller. Finally, the author thanks Josh Abel and Sean Santen for the invaluable
contributions they made to this Article and Timothy Lynch for his unending support.
1. MEDARD GABEL & HENRY BRUNER, GLOBAL INC.: AN ATLAS OF THE MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATION 3 (2003).
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laborers in the east, and people who depend on a clean environment
across the globe can be affected by the decisions a given corporation
makes.
The interconnectedness of these various constituencies, created in part
by corporations, has led us to understand that a subset of the problems
created by business has an international character. International
solutions that ensure more responsive and responsible corporate actors
are therefore necessary. The global nature of transnational corporations,
and the partially cosmopolitan identities formed in response to living in
a globalized world, has thinkers the world over developing proposals for
new or re-worked institutions, mechanisms, and frameworks for
engaging the new conditions brought on by this individual and corporate
trend toward a globalization of the corporation and cosmopolitanization
of the self. This Article will add to this literature, as it proposes that our
changed condition should cause us to rethink the formation and function
of customary international law (CIL).
The proposal contained herein would also operate outside the context
of corporate responsibility and would affect other discourse in which
human rights are given the character of CIL. 2 Still, it is a graceful
coincidence that this Article will be published together with David
Weissbrodt’s and Cynthia Williams’s most recent contributions to
scholarship promoting corporate social responsibility in the international
context, given that multinational corporations are among the most
visible of modern-day human rights violators.
The connection between the subject of this symposium—corporate
social responsibility—and the proposal made herein regarding CIL most
poignantly arises in the context of the hotly debated Alien Claims Tort
Act (ATCA or the Act). 3
Recent years have seen important
developments in the resolution of ATCA cases. In June 2004, the
United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain. 4 In that opinion, the Court addressed whether the plaintiff,
Humberto Alvarez-Machain, was entitled to recover damages under the
ATCA. 5 Although Sosa did not involve any corporate entities as
defendants, the Court’s decision is highly relevant for corporations
because of the now well-known use of the ATCA as a mechanism for
seeking redress from corporations engaged in practices that violate basic

2. For a discussion of the CIL of human rights, see infra Section IV.
3. 28 U.S.C § 1350 (2005) (alternatively called the Alien Tort Statute by the U.S. Supreme
Court and others).
4. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
5. Id.
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human rights. 6
The amicus curiae briefs filed in connection with Sosa, as well as the
writings of many scholars who have studied the impact of ATCA
litigation are evidence of the strong disagreements that have arisen in the
nearly twenty-five years of litigation under the Act. Similarly, the
statements made in the immediate aftermath of Sosa by corporate
entities and advocates of trade and corporate interests on one side 7 and
human rights advocates on the other 8 predict continued disagreement
regarding the proper scope of ATCA litigation. What there seems little
dispute over at this point, however, is that the Court’s decision in Sosa
leaves corporations exposed to continued litigation under the ATCA as
federal courts follow the Supreme Court’s guidance in identifying and
defining actionable claims under the ATCA. 9
One of the fundamental debates over ATCA litigation concerns the
power of federal courts to incorporate CIL in their decisionmaking. 10
Litigation under the ATCA and in other areas of the law has led the
federal courts and the Supreme Court into a public debate over the
proper role of foreign and international law, including CIL, in our own
decisionmaking process. 11 In the dialogue over ATCA litigation,
arguments to limit U.S. federal court employment of CIL have entailed
narrowing preexisting understandings of the definition and role of
CIL. 12 The result of this narrowing, however, is perilous for the future
of human rights litigation, including the future of litigation against

6. See infra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Press Release, National Foreign Trade Council, NFTC and USA*Engage Cite U.S.
Supreme Court Decision To More Narrowly Define Alien Tort Provision as Important Step In Curbing
Erroneous Lawsuits (June 30, 2004), at http://www.nftc.org/newsflash/newsflash.asp.
8. Human Rights First, Supreme Court Denies Claim of Alvarez-Machain, But Upholds
Important Human Rights Law, available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2004_alerts/
0629.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2005).
9. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 748 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the Supreme Court’s endorsement of
the lower-court’s definition of “actionable norms” under the ATCA).
10. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997). See also Harold
Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998), Gordon
Christenson, Problems of Proving International Human Rights Law in U.S. Courts: Customary
International Law in Domestic Court Decisions, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L 225 (1995) and others.
11. In addition to the debate that occurs among the justices in dicta within opinions such as Sosa
and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), individual members of the Court have engaged in this
debate in public forums. Justice Scalia’s address to the American Society of International Law in 2004
is an example. See ASIL Proceedings of the 98th Annual Meeting (2004). Another includes a debate
between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer held at American University on Jan. 13, 2005, a transcript of
which is available at www.american.edu/media (follow the link “speeches on campus”).
12. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999). See also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10.
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corporations violating basic human rights.
Part II of this Article will briefly describe the history of litigation
under the ATCA and describe some of the claims that have been brought
against state actors as well as private individuals and corporations. 13
Because many volumes have previously been devoted to this history, the
description in this Article will be cursory and experts on this litigation
may prefer to proceed to Parts III and forward. Part III will focus on the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.
Part IV of this Article will turn to a discussion of CIL. It will first
establish the difficulty scholars have had in determining the content of
CIL and assert that this difficulty is due, in part, to a failure to recognize
the role of individuals in the CIL formation process. It will discuss
changes in international law that have placed individuals at the center of
the international law of human rights and residual notions of
sovereignty. These elements have resulted in a failure to recognize
individuals as agents in the formation of the CIL of human rights despite
recognition of this sort in the area of human rights treaty formation.
The remainder of this Article will rely on social theory regarding
identity formation and transformation in the context of globalization.
Discussing this literature, Part V will aim to establish that identities, like
so much else in the current age, have at least partially dislodged from the
local and national and have taken on an international, global, or
cosmopolitan aspect, due in no small part to the multi-nationalization of
corporations.
Building on the idea that individual identity is now partially
cosmopolitan, Part VI will return to a discussion of CIL. This Part will
advance two core arguments. First, it will draw attention to a particular
deficit in adjudicatory machinery. The cosmopolitanism discussed in
Part V has created new opportunities and interconnectedness among
people. It has also led to problems that often require a keen awareness
of the international quality of such problems and the international law
available to address them. The international aspect of many modern
problems creates demands on existing judicial institutions to consider
avenues for the adjudication of international concerns. Properly
conceptualized, CIL and the ATCA contribute to this project. The
second argument advanced herein addresses the concerns expressed by
Professors Trimble, 14 Goldsmith, Bradley, and Posner regarding judicial
13. Part II is a brief reiteration of material published previously by the author. See Christiana
Ochoa, Access to U.S. Federal Courts as a Forum for Human Rights Disputes: Pluralism and the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 631 (2005).
14. Phillip Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665,
707–16 (1986).
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application of CIL by federal courts as an anti-democratic practice. This
Article argues that their concern relies on an unnecessarily narrow
definition of the role of courts in the democratic process and suggests
that their concern can be alleviated in two parts. First, many have
previously addressed the role of federal courts in the democratic process.
This Part will discuss the contributions others have made regarding the
role of courts in democratic society through the promotion of dialogue
over new or controversial issues. This Article will build on this work to
argue that the manner in which CIL is formed creates a responsibility on
the part of each branch of government, including the judiciary, to engage
with CIL in order to ensure that each nation’s citizens are fully
represented in international lawmaking. Courts cannot and should not
abdicate their role in interpreting CIL, as this would diminish their
traditional roles in the political process. Second, Part VI will argue that
curtailing avenues for U.S. participation in CIL formation and definition
quashes participation on the part of U.S. citizens in the creation of CIL.
Especially regarding the CIL of human rights, CIL depends on
individual participation in order to ensure that it is adequately reactive to
the exigencies created by globalization.
Given that CIL does in fact exist, limiting participation on the part of
federal courts in the identification and definition of CIL has the effect of
limiting U.S. citizens’ participation in CIL’s evolving composition. Part
VII will discuss the ideal role of the judiciary in stimulating the
formation of the CIL of human rights. To deny the courts such a role is
to deny the global aspects of individuals’ identities and is itself a
limitation on democratic participation in international lawmaking.
II. LITIGATION UNDER THE ATCA
In 1980, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
announced its decision in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala. 15 The plaintiffappellants were Paraguayan nationals who sought to convince the
Second Circuit that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over a case
involving a tort committed in Paraguay by the defendant, who was also a
Paraguayan national. According to the Filártigas, during the time Peña
was the Inspector General of Police in Asunción, Paraguay, Peña
kidnapped, tortured, and killed the Filártigas’ son and brother, Joelito
Filártiga. The plaintiffs alleged violations of “wrongful death statutes;
the U.N. Charter; the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; the U.N.
Declaration Against Torture; the American Declaration of the Rights

15. 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980).
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and Duties of Man; and other pertinent declarations, documents and
practices constituting the customary international law of human rights
and the law of nations.” 16 The plaintiffs relied on these documents as
evidence of CIL prohibiting the treatment to which Joelito Filártiga was
subjected. In so doing, they hoped to show that the requirements for
liability under the ATCA had been satisfied. 17 The ATCA provides that
the “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.” 18 The Second Circuit decided in Filártiga
that the ATCA “validly creates federal court jurisdiction for suits
alleging torts committed anywhere in the world against aliens in
violation of the law of nations.” 19
Passed by the first Congress in 1789, the ATCA was rarely invoked
until the Second Circuit breathed life into it through its decision in
Filártiga. 20 In the twenty-five years since, the Act has been at the center
of a lively controversy over the use of the United States federal court
system as a forum for settling the grievances of foreign nationals. 21
During the past quarter century, multiple claims have been brought
against actors public and private, foreign and domestic. The Filártiga
case and Kadic v. Karadzic 22 are among the most well-known and
perhaps the most emblematic of the cases in which foreign plaintiffs
have sued foreign defendants. In both cases, the plaintiffs found their
defendant in the United States and were able to serve process on the
defendant. Their suits included allegations that the defendants, acting
under color of law, engaged in tortious violations of international law.
These cases involved violations of a subset of enumerated human rights
so grave as to be indisputably prohibited by international law, including
kidnapping, torture, homicide, and violations of the laws of war. 23 The
courts in these cases applied international law against state actors or

16. Id. at 879.
17. Id.
18. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C § 1350 (2005).
19. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 879. See also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d. Cir. 1995).
20. Three cases involved the ATCA prior to Filártiga. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D.
Md. 1961); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 1 Bee
74 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607). See also Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner
at 17, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, No. 03–399 (9th Cir. Mar. 23, 2004).
21. The ATCA is central to this debate particularly as it pertains to accountability for human
rights and humanitarian law violations. There are other statutes cited in this debate, including the
aspects of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and federal antitrust statutes.
22. 70 F.3d 232.
23. See id.; Filártiga, 630 F.2d 876.
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defendants acting under color of state law. 24 Nonetheless, the opinions
published in these cases set the groundwork for future cases to be
litigated against private actors.
The Karadzic case is probably best conceptualized as a transition
between cases against public actors, or individuals acting under color of
state law, and those involving private actors as defendants. Among the
questions in Karadzic was whether Radovan Karadzic was a state
actor. 25 He was the leader of the Bosnian-Serb faction when he
perpetrated the violations at issue, but this meant he was the leader of an
unrecognized government. 26 According to the district court, he was a
private actor and, therefore, he could not be held liable for violations of
human rights. 27 The appellate court reversed, finding two separate
circumstances under which a private actor could bear international
obligations. The first was when the individual commits one of a narrow
set of wrongs that are of such gravity that state action is not considered a
requisite for responsibility—for example, genocide. The second was
when the violations were sufficiently tied to state action as to bring
international standards to bear. Still, in Karadzic’s case, the court found
that the significant support he received from the Yugoslav government
gave his conduct the color of law. 28 During the era in which ATCA
cases were limited to this type of litigation—when ATCA cases featured
only state actors alleged to have committed violations of the most
indisputably protected human rights—there was little opposition to the
statute. At that time, the State Department of the United States issued
advisory letters to the courts hearing these cases that encouraged them
not only to hear the cases, but also to feel at liberty to find the
defendants guilty for whatever violations they had committed. 29
24. The Second Circuit’s decision in Kadic addresses this issue directly. Radovan Karadzic was
the leader of the self-proclaimed Serb-Bosnian republic, “Srpska.” Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236. The court
discussed in dicta that the application of certain aspects of international law need not be limited to states
or state actors but preferred to characterize Karadzic as a state actor rather than as a private individual
because he was acting under color of law because of his collaboration with the former Yugoslavia or
with substantial Yugoslavian aid. But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775–76
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (stating that the application of international law is limited in
this way: “[s]pecifically, I do not believe the law of nations imposes the same responsibility or liability
on non-state actors, such as the PLO, as it does on states and persons acting under color of state law.”).
25. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filàrtiga v. Peña-Irala, (2d Cir.
1980), reprinted in 19 INT’L LEG. MATS. 585 (1980). Statement of Interest of the United States, Kadic
v. Karadzic, No. 94–9035 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming the ATCA and the Filàrtiga litigation), cited in
Statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith, Professor of International Law,
Yale Law School, before the House Committee on International Relations on “A Survey and Analysis of
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Still, the recognition in Karadzic that private actors could bear
responsibility for human rights violations under the ATCA led to the
development of claims against private actors, including corporate actors,
for violations of international law—primarily the CIL of human rights.
Well-known examples include a case brought against Royal Dutch/Shell
Oil charging the defendants with complicity in human rights violations
in Nigeria, including the killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and others who were
protesting a pipeline the company was laying; 30 the Aguinda v. Texaco,
Inc. litigation, in which indigenous people in Ecuador brought an action
against Texaco alleging multiple violations of rights recognized by
international human rights treaties; 31 and a case initiated by Burmese
peasants alleging that Unocal Corporation was complicit in the violation
of various human rights, including forced relocation, torture, rape, and
murder, which were committed by the Burmese military while providing
security for the construction of a Unocal pipeline. 32
The ATCA portion of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 33 featured a different
kind of private actor as its defendant. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, the
original plaintiff in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, was a Mexican national
who was kidnapped in Mexico by other Mexican citizens acting on
behalf of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). He was
thereafter transported to the United States where he was arrested,
imprisoned, tried, and acquitted of any involvement in the murder of a
DEA agent. After returning to his home country, he sued the Mexican
citizens who kidnapped him, including Francisco Sosa, for contracting
for his abduction. 34
At the end of June 2004, the Supreme Court found that AlvarezMachain was not entitled to recover damages from Sosa under the
ATCA. 35 Still, the decision did not close the door on ATCA claims, as
many had feared it might. Instead, the Court’s opinion was a directive
to the lower federal courts regarding the types of claims they should
recognize under the ATCA. 36
Another significant ATCA occurrence came in November 2004 when
Judge Sprizzo of the United States District Court for the Southern

Supporting Human Rights and Democracy 2002–03” July 9, 2003 at nn. 15, 16.
30. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386 (KMW), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3293 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2002).
31. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d. Cir. 2002).
32. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
33. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 700 (2004). See also infra Part III.
34. Id. at 697–99.
35. Id. at 692–93.
36. See infra notes 39–46 and accompanying text (discussing criteria lower courts are to apply).
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District of New York used the tools laid out in Justice Scalia’s
concurrence in Sosa in order to dismiss a set of South Africa apartheid
cases, including those against corporations that failed to divest from
South Africa during the apartheid era. 37
In December 2004, Unocal and the Burmese peasants mentioned
earlier settled out of court, ending a long litigation battle over Unocal’s
alleged complicity in human rights violations committed by the Burmese
government. Although the terms of the settlement are confidential, in
principle it “will compensate plaintiffs and provide funds enabling
plaintiffs and their representatives to improve living conditions,
healthcare and education, and protect the rights of people from the
pipeline region.” 38 Although there has been some debate over the
meaning of this settlement, commentators have generally agreed that
Unocal was trying to avoid a publicized court decision finding them
liable under the ATCA. 39
III. CIL AND THE SOSA DECISION
This Part will focus on the Court’s treatment of CIL and the directive
the Court’s opinion gave to the lower federal courts as to the treatment
of future ATCA claims. Among the questions the Court tried to answer
were how to translate the norms originally contemplated by this 200year-old statute into a modern day formulation. Or, rather, how to apply
the law of nations, limited at that time to prohibitions on violations of
safe conduct, the protection of ambassadors, and the outlawing of
piracy, to a world in which human rights are increasingly taking on the
character of CIL.
Nearly twenty years ago, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (the Restatement) included
prohibitions against genocide, slavery, extra-judicial killing,
disappearances, and torture or inhuman treatment in its list of human
rights that had become CIL. 40 But many scholars have argued for a
broader substantive definition of CIL, such that, if we were to take them
all seriously, CIL would include essentially all the rights enumerated in

37. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
38. American Society of International Law, International Law in Brief, “Unocal to Reach
Settlement in Alien Tort Claims Act Case” (Dec. 13, 2000), available at http://www.asil.org/ilib/
2005/01/ilib050128.htm#b1 (last visited July 15, 2005).
39. Unocal Settles Rights Suit in Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at C6.
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS § 702 (1987).
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 41
It was in the context of debates over which human rights were
included in CIL that the Sosa Court attempted to define what was meant
by the “law of nations” under the ATCA. The Court decided that “any
claim based on the present-day law of nations [should] [1] rest on a
norm of international character, [that is] [2] accepted by the civilized
world and [3] defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the
18th-century paradigms” that led to the ATCA’s enactment. 42
It appears that the first two factors the Court lays out are essentially a
reformulation of the traditional view of CIL. The Court anticipated that
its third criterion would create confusion for future litigants. At many
junctures, the opinion urges lower court judges to exercise caution when
considering claims under the ATCA. For example, the Court stated that
“there are good reasons for a restrained conception of the discretion a
federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of action of this
kind.” 43
Still, the Court was not so restrictive in its interpretation of the ATCA
and the state of play of Erie 44 that it shut the door on a court’s derivation
41. See, e.g., Dana Zartner Falstrom, Stemming the Flow of Environmental Displacement:
Creating a Convention to Protect Persons and Preserve the Environment, 2001 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 1, 23 (2001) (“However, I believe the concept of protecting environmentally displaced
persons can be found in existing treaty law and customary international law.”); Leonard M. Hammer,
Reconsidering the Israeli Court’s Application of Customary International Law in the Human Rights
Context, 5 ILSA J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 23, 28 (1998) (“While it is difficult to disentangle instances in
which the courts have referred exclusively to custom as opposed to constitutional principles, the courts
have referred to the customary international law status of the right to housing, own property, equal
protection of the law for aliens, and the right against discrimination.”) One could provide similar
citations for most if not all rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR,
and the ICESCR.
Thus as early as 1965 the late Judge Waldock, perhaps a bit prematurely, concluded that
the Universal Declaration had become, in to, a part of binding, customary international
law. Three years later the non-governmental Assembly for Human Rights adopted the
Montreal Statement, which included the assertion that the “Universal Declaration of
Human Rights . . . has over the years become a part of customary international law.”
Richard Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J.
INT’L. & COMP. L. 1, 2 (1995–96).
42. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
43. Id. at 725. Other examples include: “A series of reasons argue for judicial caution when
considering the kinds of individual claims that might implement the jurisdiction conferred by the early
statute.” Id. (describing five reasons for caution).
44. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 749–50 (describing Erie as “the watershed in which we denied the
existence of any federal ‘general’ common law”). Because Erie did away with federal common law,
some have argued that the judiciary can no longer recognize customary international law apart from
Congressional authorization. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10, at 852–55. However,
others have responded that although Erie rejected general federal common law, it still left federal courts
with jurisdiction to develop law in areas that specifically concern federal—rather than state—issues,
including international law. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, The Law of our Land: Customary International
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of substantive CIL norms. Instead, the Court adopted the view that “the
door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a
narrow class of international norms today.” 45 Rather than enumerate
which norms currently can meet the standards the Court established, it
adopted a formulation that accommodates the mutable nature of CIL and
recognizes that CIL is subject to change—especially in the realm of
human rights. In its final formulation, the Sosa opinion employed the
reasoning and language of Judge Edwards’s concurrence in Tel-Oren 46
and of the Marcos 47 litigation in requiring that claims under the ATCA
rely on international law norms that are 1) definable or specific, 2)
universal, and 3) obligatory. 48 In the final assessment, it appears the
Court is requiring that claims under the ATCA rely on norms that really
are CIL, rather than norms that some might argue ought to be CIL.
This leads us to look again at the Supreme Court’s second factor—
that a claim based on the modern day law of nations must be accepted by
the civilized world. 49 This factor takes us to the heart of the seemingly
impenetrable problem of determining what really is accepted by the
civilized world—what CIL really is.
IV. IDENTIFYING THE CIL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Finding CIL
In examining the question of what CIL is, this Article looks to
standard-bearers, such as Henkin and Slaughter, revisionists, such as
Bradley, Goldsmith, and Posner, and those arguing for paradigm shifts,
such as D’Amato and Charney. 50 Though this Article does not share
D’Amato’s or Charney’s views entirely, it does posit that the current
methods of thinking about CIL are lacking and that it is necessary to
think about CIL in new ways. In the face of a litany of changing

Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 433–47 (1997).
45. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
46. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring) (stating that actions under the ATCA should be limited to “a handful of heinous actions—
each of which violates definable, universal and obligatory norms”).
47. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (adopting
the position that CIL norms must be “specific, universal, and obligatory” in order to be actionable under
the ATCA).
48. See Section C of the Court’s opinion. Sosa, 542 U.S. 731–38.
49. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
50. Anthony D’Amato, Human Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A Plea for
Change of Paradigms, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 47 (1995–96).
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conditions brought on by globalization and cosmopolitanization, current
methods of thinking about CIL formation are outmoded. Like these
authors, I also think CIL is due for a paradigm shift.
This is the project this Article initiates, in an attempt to ultimately
address at least two recurring problems in CIL that are often dragged
onto the mat when one is wrestling with CIL. The first is the democratic
participation problem; the second is the action-versus-words dilemma
inherent in determinations of what ought to serve as evidence of CIL.
Though this Article will only address the first of these issues, it will lay
the groundwork for a later discussion of the action-versus-words
problem. In order to address either of these problems, though, it is
necessary to first explain my core proposal.
Many believe it is difficult to determine the content of CIL because
there may be too many sources to which one must look in determining
whether or not a particular norm has attained the status of custom. 51
The idea is that there are too many statements from too many countries
and renowned jurists as to what human rights states observe out of a
sense of obligation to allow for an accurate accounting of the current
content of CIL.
Perhaps this is incorrect and, instead, one of the reasons it is so
difficult to determine the content of CIL is that there are too few sources
rather than too many currently being taken into account. It is plausible
that the sources of data to which one looks in trying to determine which
norms are CIL are overly limited or at least that they are not derived
from all the necessary locations.
The current CIL formation process formally looks only to the actions
and words of states. What is missing in the current system of CIL is a
recognition that individuals ought to be active participants in the CIL
formation process; that individuals ought to be consulted regarding the
content of CIL. McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen have given cursory
attention to this possibility. They state that the words and actions that
make up evidence of CIL “may include the acts and utterances not only
of officials (transnational and national) . . . but even of private
individuals and representatives of nongovernmental organizations.” 52
This could be accomplished through a proliferation of venues such as
the International Court of Justice, 53 courts entertaining claims based on

51. See, e.g., id.
52. MYERS S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC
POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 269 (1980).
53. See Vincent Chetail, The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to International
Humanitarian Law, INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS No. 850, 235, 238 (2003) (“Contemporary
international humanitarian law is composed of: (A) a complex set of conventional rules, (B) customary
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universal jurisdiction statutes, or provisional courts such as the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda or the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 54 where individuals can
and do advance claims undergirded by assertions of particular human
rights norms as CIL.
These venues, together with empirical
documentation of which norms individuals invoke as CIL, would allow
us to learn and better understand what individuals truly believe have
come to be their rights under international law and, more specifically,
under CIL. Since individuals are the subjects of the CIL of human
rights, it must be that information regarding their perceptions of their
rights under CIL would be helpful.
B. The CIL of Human Rights
During the 1990s, international law scholars began to recognize that
human rights norms that had taken on the character of customary
international law had emerged as a particular category of CIL distinct
from the wider body of CIL. 55 Several characteristics make the CIL of
human rights different from traditional CIL, including a departure from
the “approach that looks [exclusively] ‘into the past to identify
customary patterns of State practice’ and then turns ‘this empirical result
into a normative projection for the future.’” 56 The new CIL of human
rights also requires cognizance of the sometimes rapidly evolving opinio
juris component of CIL, such that a mutable view of CIL can be taken,
which can accommodate new and additional human rights norms.
The relative changeability of the CIL of human rights is distinct from
traditional conceptions of CIL, and thus it has received a wide degree of
criticism and proposals for new ways of thinking and talking about it, as
well as proposals that we create new categories of international law to

norms and (C) jus cogens, which the case law of the International Court of Justice helps to clarify and
interpret.”).
54. This is suggested in the Tadic case, where the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia held that CIL imposes criminal liability for serious violations of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Judgment of 2nd Oct. 1995, para. 137, 35 I.L.M. 32
(1996).
55. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS § 702 (1987) (devoting a section on customary
international law to the sub-category of the CIL of human rights). See also Bruno Simma & Philip
Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL.
Y.B. INT’L L. 82 (1992). A 1994 symposium hosted by the Georgia Journal of International &
Comparative Law devoted to the issue of the CIL of human rights. Richard Lillich’s contribution to that
symposium is a good example of the focused attention the sub-category of CIL of human rights received
as it emerged in the discourse among international law scholars. See Lillich, supra note 41, at 10.
56. Lillich, supra note 41, at 12–13 (quoting Simma & Alston, supra note 55, at 89).
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accommodate the necessary potential for the CIL of human rights to
change rapidly. For example, Louis Henkin has proposed a new source
of international law, termed “non-conventional law,” 57 which he sees as
being less dependent on custom and more based on “contemporary
human values” which make up a fundamental or quasi-constitutional
law. 58
Similarly, the late Jonathan Charney acknowledged the lamentably
slow traditional development of CIL and argued that the rise of global
problems has necessitated the development of an international law that
does not require sweeping international consensus in order to gain
authority. He argued that the traditional processes of developing CIL
may have suited an era in which sovereignty was the foremost principle,
but the increase in the number of diverse states, coupled with the
decreasing ability of domestic legal systems to maintain isolation from
the international sphere, require a change in the way international law
and norms are developed. 59 He joined those who argued that the
aftermath of World War II reflected a new willingness to bind states to
international norms, regardless of an individual state’s acceptance of
those norms. 60
Rather than attempting to argue that CIL be changed to accommodate
this shift in international lawmaking, Charney proposed what he called
“universal” or “general” international law, which avoids the problem of
attempting to develop a CIL of human rights within the traditional CIL
formation process. Charney made clear that his proposal is not
revolutionary. Rather, it reflects the current practice of multilateral
forums that, through their everyday operations, accelerate the
development of international law. 61
Others have rejected proposals by authors such as Henkin and
Charney for the creation of new categories of international law and have
maintained that the two principal sources of international law are, and
should remain, treaty and custom. 62 That being the case, any provision
of international law that does not derive its status as such from treaty
must necessarily derive its status from CIL. For those who maintain this
traditional formulation of international law, it has become important to

57. Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 37
(1995–96).
58. Id.
59. Jonathan Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 543–44 (1993).
60. Id. at 550.
61. Id.
62. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of International
Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997).
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name the rapidly evolving human rights sub-category of international
customary law. 63 This category has often been called the CIL of human
rights 64 and this Article will adopt this terminology. 65
C. The CIL of Human Rights and the Individual
For much of its history, international law was concerned with
relations among autonomous states. States were seen as both its creators
and its subjects, under the traditional assumptions that international law
is based on an interstate system in which each state is sovereign. 66
Historically, this was an accurate conception of international law, as its
primary concerns “until well into this century were diplomatic relations,
war, treaties and the law of the sea.” 67
In the wake of World War II, a fundamental change occurred in the
field of international law as a result of the emergence of international
human rights law. This development shifted the focus of international
law so that state values and concerns were no longer the exclusive issues
addressed by international law. 68
In traditional international law the individual played an inconspicuous
part because the international interests of the individual and his contacts
across the frontier were rudimentary. This is no longer the case. 69

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant
of Economic Social and Cultural Rights, as well as all subsequent
human rights treaties, have clearly placed a distinct focus on the
individual and on human, rather than state, interests. These treaties were
developed to protect individuals from each other and, importantly, from
the actions of states. As a result of this “acknowledgement of the worth

63. See id. For some it has become important to identify this sub-category in an effort to simply
understand the changing nature of CIL. For others, it has been in an effort to assert the importance of
maintaining the traditional CIL formation process in order to argue for a narrow definition of the content
of CIL such that new and developing human rights norms are not easily included.
64. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 62, at 319.
65. Though the current author is adopting the term “CIL of human rights,” she refrains from
taking a position at this time as to the approaches of Henkin, Charney, and others who have argued for a
new source or category of international law. While it may be that the articulation and development of
such new categories is necessary, defining a position on this is outside the scope of this Article.
66. LOUIS C. HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 2–3 (4th ed. 2001).
67. Charney, supra note 59, at 529.
68. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 66, at 3.
69. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 61 (1950), reprinted in
HENRY STEINER & PHILLIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS,
MORALS 147 (2d ed. 2000).
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of the human personality as the ultimate unit of all law,” 70 there has
been an attendant “recognition of the individual as a subject of
international rights.” 71 No longer are states the exclusive subjects, nor
are individuals merely objects, of international law.
At the same time, individuals have taken an active and participatory
role in the development of human rights treaties. Experts who are
currently assigned the task of drafting new human rights treaties or
norms have become sophisticated in their approach to ensuring that the
documents will be relevant and effective in addressing pertinent themes.
For example, in the context of this symposium, Professor Weissbrodt
has explained the conscientious process by which he and his team
consulted with essential individuals and relevant organizations as part of
the process of drafting the Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard
to Human Rights. 72
The rationale for this consultation includes a belief that if human
rights norms are meant to protect individuals, it is necessary to know
what protections individuals actually need. Without such consultation,
any new norms or treaties might miss an opportunity to be most
effective. In this way, human rights treaties have also changed the
traditional conceptions of international law. Just as states are no longer
the only subjects of international law, nor are they any longer in
exclusive control of the international law formation process.
While the development of international human rights law has resulted
in individuals becoming generally recognized as subjects of treaty law,
just as they have become active participants in human rights treaty
formation, there has been little formal change in the traditional thinking
about how CIL is formed. Traditional thinking about the process by
which CIL is formed is among the last great stands of the exclusive
sovereignty of states in international law. Here, and in few other places,
it “is the sovereign State, with its claim to exclusive allegiance and its
pretensions to exclusive usefulness that interposes itself as an
impenetrable barrier between the individual and the greater society of all
humanity.” 73
Like human rights treaty law, the CIL of human rights aims to protect

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Human Rights Principles and Responsibilities for Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/XX, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/WG.2/WP.1 (February
2002 for discussion in July/August 2002); see also David Weissbrodt, Business and Human Rights, 74
U. CIN. L. REV. 55, 68–71 (2005).
73. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 69, at 61.
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individuals, making individuals the subject of that law. Yet, with few
exceptions, individuals have only very indirect mechanisms for
participation in the formation of the CIL of human rights through their
governments’ words and occasionally conflicting actions. But it need
not be this way. What individuals do and what they believe about which
human rights currently are or ought to be afforded and protected in the
civilized world should be a factor in any determination of whether a
norm is accepted by the civilized world, thus making it part of the CIL
of human rights. 74
This is an underdeveloped idea. However, there is some evidence
that others have considered the possibility that individuals ought to be
consulted in the CIL formation process. Consider for example:
the liberal notion that private transnational behavior serves a quasi-public
purpose in creating the web of economic interdependence between
nations. Perhaps it follows from liberal international theory that the CIL
process should take into account the practice of private persons and
enterprises as well as the practice of States. Such a notion is even more
radical than the idea that the State practice of democracies should count
more than that of dictatorships or any other types of non-liberal States. 75

While this idea may seem radical on first impression, the central
assertion of this Article is that not only ought individuals be consulted
when looking for evidence of CIL of human rights but that, in practice,
they already are. Jordan Paust has articulated that “the reality of
individual participation is another important feature of customary human
rights law that is too often ignored or viewed less than
comprehensively.” 76 Paust is among the few scholars who have
attempted to articulate the role of the individual in the formation of the
CIL of human rights. 77 He states:
Individual participation in the creation and shaping of customary human
rights is less well-perceived, but no less real. All human beings
recognizably participate in a dynamic process of acceptance or
expectation which leads to patterns of opinio juris measurable at various
74. Whether a norm is accepted by the civilized world is one of the criteria the Sosa decision
established for future determinations of whether a claim brought under the ATCA is legitimate. See
supra note 42 and the accompanying text.
75. David P. Fidler, Challenging the Classical Concept of Custom: Perspectives on the Future of
Customary International Law, 39 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INT’L LAW 198, 241 (1996).
76. Jordan J. Paust, The Complex Nature, Sources and Evidences of Customary Human Rights,
25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 147, 155 (1995–96).
77. See id. at 155–58, 162; Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources
and Status as Law of the United States, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 59, 69–73 (1990); see also Jordan J. Paust,
The Reality of Private Rights, Duties, and Participation in the International Legal Process, 25 MICH. J.
INT’L. L. 1229, 1245 (2004).
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moments. 78 . . . Since each nation-state, indeed each human being, is a
participant in both the attitudinal and behavioral aspects of dynamic
customary human rights law, each may initiate a change in such law, or,
with others, reaffirm its validity. 79

Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen have also considered the
role of the individual in international law and specifically the importance
of the individual in shaping the norms that come to make up the CIL of
human rights. They view the world as a meshing of small and large,
powerful and less powerful communities that are in constant contact
with each other such that they and their values intermingle and
interpenetrate. In this “comprehensive social process” individuals are
constantly “engaged in the shaping and sharing of values.” These
values, in turn, become “the human rights which the larger community
of humankind protects or fails to protect.” 80
Lung-chu Chen has taken a particularly critical view of what he calls
the “Vattelian fiction,” which he describes as being contained in
Emmeric de Vattel’s position that an injury to an individual was an
injury to that person’s state. Under this conception of individual rights
under international law, if the rights of a citizen of a given state are
violated, only that state is permitted to carry the claims of the violated
individual to the international plane. 81
Chen goes on to explain, however, that the contemporary human
rights movement has demanded a number of changes in the traditional
methods of thinking about international law. For example, he points to
the global concern for human welfare, such that human rights are “no
longer matters of domestic jurisdiction” but have become matters of
international concern. 82 As a result, international law has expanded its
scope such that it now protects all human beings, not only from abuse by
foreign governments, but also from abuses committed by their own
governments. 83 “Indeed,” Chen states, “a state centered international
law is being transformed into an international law of homocentricity.”84
These authors have considered the possibility and reality of
consulting the actions of individuals as evidence of the CIL of human
78. Paust, supra note 76, at 155 (citing LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 76–81 (1989); MCDOUGAL
ET AL., supra note 52, at 73–74, 80 n.208, 81, 86, 88–89, 96–107, 167–68, 173–79, 207–16, 269, 413,
416, 471; Paust, Customary International Law, supra note 77, at 69–73).
79. Paust, supra note 76, at 156–57.
80. MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 52, at 94.
81. CHEN, supra note 78, at 77.
82. Id. at 78.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 79.
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rights. Though Paust asserts that individual expectations can take part in
the formation of opinio juris, neither Paust nor others articulate how
individuals might express such expectations such that they take on the
weight of evidence of CIL. McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen come close
to doing so but in order to do this, they first must redefine “custom.”
The following extract demonstrates their effort to accentuate the
individual over the nation-state:
Through the concept of “custom,” that is, of law created by uniformities
of people’s behavior and other communications, individuals and their
private associations have always participated in the prescribing
function. 85

It is not clear whether the “custom” to which they refer is customary
international law or whether it is some other sort of less-recognized
custom. However, they go on to state that individuals have the ability to
“invoke the authoritative application of transnational prescription”
though their use of and appearance before national and international
courts and tribunals. 86
Even if one concludes, as this Article does, that the “custom” to
which McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen refer is, or at least contributes to,
CIL, what they seem to miss is the possibility that individuals exercising
the invocation function—or appearing in courts and tribunals—has an
effect on the formation of CIL.
National courts and the international courts and tribunals referred to
by McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen, as well as mechanisms like the
ATCA, provide avenues through which individuals might have direct
participation in the CIL formation process. In submitting ATCA claims
before a U.S. federal court, for example, individual plaintiffs formally
express their expectations regarding the human rights protections to
which they believe they are entitled.
When individuals are harmed and recognize that harm as wrongful,
they may engage the legal system to seek redress. If they do so through
a suit that claims a violation of their human rights under international
law, they leave a pool of evidence about their beliefs regarding the
protections international law actually affords or ought to afford them.
Such legal actions may rest on claims of violations of treaty law,
customary law, or both. Most party briefs in such litigation will clearly
indicate claims as treaty-based or CIL-based. Still, it may, at times, be
difficult to discern to what extent the rights claimed are rights based on
treaty law or customary law and may muddy the aid some legal actions
85. MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 52, at 177.
86. Id.
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can bring to the question of what individuals believe their human rights
are, as a matter of CIL.
Litigation under the ATCA is an exceptionally pure venue for this
type of evidence pooling. Claims under the Act must be founded on
violations of “the law of nations,” or CIL. The statute reads in its
entirety: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.” 87 However, the United States
has failed to accept any provision in any human rights treaty giving
individuals the right to initiate private actions under such treaties. As a
result, the ATCA has been limited to application in cases where the
plaintiffs can point to CIL as the basis for their claims.
In all cases where claims are based on human rights violations,
litigation under the ATCA is thus an excellent source of evidence of the
beliefs of individuals as to the CIL of human rights. Through their
ATCA suits, plaintiffs enter into discussions with the particular judges
or panels of judges hearing their claims about what the CIL of human
rights is and what it ought to be. In so doing, they also provide valuable
information to nation-state representatives, the judiciaries of other
nations, and to multinational bodies about which norms civilized people
believe form the CIL of human rights.
This Article has already discussed the changeable character of the
CIL of human rights. Given that this is the case, evidence seen through
observing litigation under the ATCA is highly valuable in forming
accounts of what individuals believe composes the CIL of human rights.
This litigation can indicate what the individuals who make up the
civilized world believe are their rights as citizens therein.
In liberal democratic societies, the beliefs and opinions of individuals
as to what rights are and ought to be are important in their actual
formation or mutation over time. Alexander Bickel has addressed this
phenomenon in the domestic constitutional context:
The preliminary suggestions may be advanced that the rule of principle
imposed by the Court is seldom rigid, that the Court has ways of
persuading before it attempts to coerce, and that, over time, sustained
opinion running counter to the Court’s constitutional law can achieve its
nullification, directly or by desuetude. It may further be that if the
process is properly carried out, an aspect of the current—not only the
timeless, mystic—popular will finds expression in constitutional
adjudication. The result may be a tolerable accommodation with the

87. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2005) (emphasis added).
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theory and practice of democracy. 88

Like American constitutional law, the CIL of human rights is
changeable. Thus, maintaining official venues for individuals to
formally express their beliefs as to their rights is necessary to ensure that
the CIL of human rights remains vibrant and relevant to ever-changing
social, economic, and political conditions.
D. Obstacles to Individual Participation in Forming
the CIL of Human Rights
1. Revisionist Views of CIL
Those versed in CIL literature may at this point be thinking about the
concerns voiced by Professors Bradley, Goldsmith, Posner, Trimble, and
others that allowing our judiciary to interpret CIL is undemocratic.
Professor Trimble, for example, has argued that CIL is illegitimate
because, inter alia, it is incompatible with the American political
tradition. 89 Professor Trimble explains that U.S. judges must base their
opinions on accepted reasons, such as the violation of constitutional
rights. Courts cannot base their decisions on whether “the judge saw
three crows cross the full moon the night before the decision;” 90 such an
opinion would not be accepted by the American people. CIL, he argues,
is analogous to a judge basing his decision upon the story of the crows,
rather than upon accepted legal precedents.
Professor Trimble reaches this conclusion by arguing that the
American political tradition is rooted in a limited government that is
responsive to its constituencies. However, he argues that because CIL is
created by foreign governments that “are neither representative of the
American political community nor responsive to it,” 91 CIL cannot be
reconciled with American political philosophy. This view seemingly
fails to see the potential for, and the reality of, American participation in
the CIL formation process.
American political organs do participate in the CIL formation process.
Some have argued persuasively that, in fact, the United States has an
overly influential role in the CIL formation process due to its power and

88. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 28 (1986) (emphasis added).
89. Trimble, supra note 14 at 716–23.
90. Id. at 718.
91. Id. at 721.
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persuasiveness. A recent essay by Michael Byers is useful in developing
an understanding of the influence of power on the formation of CIL. 92
In it, he cites the work of Charles de Visscher, who observed in 1953:
international custom has been compared to the gradual formation of a
road across vacant land. . . . Among the users are always some who mark
the soil more deeply with their footprints than others, either because of
their weight, which is to say their power in this world, or because their
interests bring them more frequently this way. 93

The activity of helping a court determine the law is a democratic
process in which the judiciary and the bar have been involved since the
inception of the American legal system. The Memorandum for the
United States as Amicus Curiae in Filàrtiga v. Peña-Irala illustrates this
point. 94 The memorandum does not specifically argue that courts are
acting consistently with the American political tradition in helping to
define CIL. But the memorandum essentially accomplishes this task by
presenting reasoned legal analysis, encouraging the Second Circuit to
adopt the position that torture violates the law of nations. 95
Determining the law is a judicial process as old as the judiciary itself.
Rather than being inconsistent with the American political tradition,
defining the contours of CIL is a function that U.S. courts have been
engaged in for quite some time, and it is a process that is suitable for the
judicial branch to undertake.
The concern expressed by CIL revisionist scholars is that the
application of CIL by U.S. courts is undemocratic because CIL has not
been formed through the American democratic process and is not part of
our federal common law. Their concern is for the American democratic
process, and this Article does not intend to diminish that concern. 96 But
for all the consternation about the American democratic process, their
concern fails to see the forest for the trees. It fails to see the broader
potential for democratic participation in the formation of the CIL of
human rights. The remainder of this Article will argue that it is
92. See Michael Byers, Introduction Power, Obligation, and Customary International Law, 11
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 81, 84–85 (2001).
93. CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (Percy
Corbett trans., 1957), reprinted in Michael Byers, Introduction Power Obligation and Customary
International Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 81, 84 (2001). Professor Byers also points to the work
of Michael Reisman, Oscar Schachter, and Surge Sur in establishing the idea that powerful states
influence the CIL formation process more than less powerful states.
94. Memorandum for the United States Submitted to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 19 I.L.M. 585 (1980).
95. Id.
96. A proper investigation of the American constitutional arguments surrounding the ATCA is
beyond the scope of this Article.

2005]

COSMOPOLITANISM AND CIL

127

appropriate to consider and realize this broader potential because of a
fundamental shift in society and a fundamental shift in our conception of
ourselves.
2. Traditional Notions of Sovereignty
The greatest difficulty concerning individual participation in the
constitutive process of CIL has historically been the exclusive focus on
the role of the nation state. This view has traditionally resulted in great
reluctance to see the role that the individual can and may play in the
formation of CIL. While this view may have been well adapted to the
international legal order before the end of World War II when
individuals had minimal participation in international law as either
subjects or objects thereof, the establishment of the human rights
movement, which aims to protect individuals and which requires their
participation to previously unknown extents, has made the exclusive
focus on the sovereignty of nation-states simply outmoded.
The international legal order now recognizes that the nation-state can
be both a protector and a violator of human rights. This is the reason
human rights treaties protect individuals from state and state-sponsored
abuses. The potential power of international human rights law to protect
individuals from their own states is a well-settled example of a reorientation of the concept of national sovereignty such that less power is
being vested in the state and more in the individual. Nonetheless,
individuals are not seen as participatory actors in the formation of the
CIL of human rights, despite the likelihood of violations of the CIL of
human rights being perpetrated by states. 97
V. COSMOPOLITAN IDENTITIES
A rethinking of CIL begins with a rethinking of who should be
empowered in the CIL formation process. Ironically, though perhaps
logically, this rethinking starts with Immanuel Kant, a contemporary of

97. This failure to recognize individuals as participants in the CIL formation process creates
some riddles that have long puzzled scholars on CIL. Take, for example, state A, which has signed
treaties and made declarations regarding a protection against capital punishment. Regardless, State A
continues to implement the death penalty. When assessing whether there has emerged a right to be
protected from capital punishment, should one look to the treaties and statements of State A as evidence
of emerging custom or should they look to State A’s engagement in capital punishment as evidence that
State A does not subscribe to a protection against capital punishment as a matter of CIL. This is known
as the action-versus-words problem and is, as yet, unresolved. It is possible that an emphasis on the
individual may help to alleviate this problem, though a detailed exploration of this question must be
reserved for another day.

128

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

the first American Congress, which drafted the ATCA. Kant wrote in
one of his many essays on peace and cosmopolitanism:
The peoples of the earth have entered in varying degree into a universal
community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights
in one part of the world is felt everywhere. The idea of a cosmopolitan
right is not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the
unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a
universal right of humanity. 98

Although the notion of a “universal community” is not novel, the idea
is more a reality today than at any time in the past. 99 The end of the
Cold War, the emergence of global financial markets, and the explosion
of global mass media have all contributed to the increased
interconnectedness of the earth’s peoples.
The globalization
phenomenon has generated an astonishing amount of scholarship. A
wide variety of disciplinary treatments has resulted in different
approaches, interpretations, and appraisals of globalization.
The lack of any universally accepted consensus or narrative on
globalization should not be seen as evidence that the phenomenon does
not exist. Rather, scholars utilizing a variety of approaches have
highlighted strikingly similar developments that indicate the reality of
the formation of an increasingly global interconnectedness. The tug
between local and global, and between homogeneity and heterogeneity,
is a manifestation and symptom of this increasing interconnectedness.
This Article adopts the work of Benedict Anderson and his
subsequent adaptation and interpretation by other scholars like Manuel
Castells, who argue that the rise of the global economy and mass
media—the two being inextricably linked—has created a nascent global
community. 100
Benedict Anderson’s essential argument in Imagined Communities is
that the development of print capitalism provided the foundation for the
development of national consciousness by creating a common,
standardized language that allowed previously disconnected people to
“imagine” themselves as part of a larger community, despite the fact that
98. IMMANUEL KANT, KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 107–08 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet, trans.,
2d ed. 1991), quoted in David Harvey, Cosmopolitanism and the Banality of Geographical Evils, 12
PUBLIC CULTURE 2, 529, 532 (2000).
99. DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE
327.
100. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (rev. ed. 1991). Anderson’s central argument is that the development of print
capitalism provided the foundation for the development of national consciousness by creating a
common, standardized language that allowed previously disconnected people to “imagine” themselves
as part of a larger community, despite the fact that these people never actually met.
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these people never actually met. The development of national
consciousness in Europe provides an illustrative case study in this
process. Anderson demonstrates that, prior to the invention of the
printing press, Latin was the overwhelmingly dominant language of
educated Europe. Few books were printed in vernacular languages.
Latin owed its dominance in large part to the dominance of the Catholic
Church, and the two were inextricably linked. The development of the
printing press, coupled with the “logic of capitalism,” led to an everincreasing search for markets. Once the Latin-reading market had been
saturated, printers began to expand into vernacular languages in order to
expand their market. This undermined the sacral position of Latin as the
dominant language and undermined the Catholic Church’s vise-grip on
the communication of ideas. 101
Having demonstrated the disruptive effect that print capitalism had on
the status quo, Anderson moves to his argument about the power of the
print languages to unite. He argues that print language united in three
ways: (1) by creating a unified means of communication that would
have been impossible in even spoken vernaculars (because of the huge
varieties of English, Spanish, etc.), and thus fostering an awareness of
other people in that “particular language-field, and at the same time that
only those hundreds of thousands, or millions, belonged;” 102 (2) by
giving “a new fixity to language which . . . helped to build that image of
antiquity that was so central to the subjective idea of the nation;” and (3)
by creating “languages-of-power” that essentially eliminated or
assimilated certain variations while elevating those closest to the print
language. 103
Eventually, the print vernacular became adopted by the developing
state bureaucracies as the language of business, and the rising
bureaucracies were filled by the growing middle class, which was
necessarily versed in the new vernacular. “The general growth in
literacy, commerce, industry, communications and state machinery . . .
created powerful new impulses for vernacular linguistic unification.” 104
This linguistic unification allowed physically disconnected people
across large distances to imagine themselves as part of a community
101. This is the foundation of Anderson’s thesis, and it has been somewhat simplified here in
order to avoid tangentially related arguments about the elimination of “a conception of temporality in
which cosmology and history were indistinguishable.” The central point is that the overthrow of a sacral
language that was inextricably linked with a dominant social hierarchy undermined the seeming
eternality and antiquity of the status quo, thereby allowing people to begin imagining themselves in new
ways. Id. at 36.
102. Id. at 44 (italics in original).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 77.
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based on this shared language. 105 As literacy increased, “it became
easier to arouse popular support, with the masses discovering a new
glory in the print elevation of languages they had humbly spoken all
along.” 106
Manuel Castells, through exhaustive empirical and historical research,
has demonstrated that we are currently in a unique “information
technology revolution” whose transformative capacity far exceeds that
of the “industrial revolution.” 107 Building on Anderson’s work through
a utilization of largely empirical economic and demographic data,
Castells argues that the world is turning into a “network society,” with
everything and everyone interconnected. According to Castells:
What characterizes the development of the informational, global economy
is precisely its emergence in very different cultural/national contexts: in
North America, in Western Europe, in Japan, in the “China circle,” in
Russia, in Latin America, as well as its planetary reach, affecting all
countries, and leading to a multi-cultural framework of reference. 108

To exemplify this interconnectedness, Castells points to the
“business-led explosive urban growth” of cities such as Bangkok,
Taipei, and Shanghai, and Western cities such as Madrid, New York,
and London. He reminds us that at various moments these cities
together “went into a slump that triggered a sharp downturn in real estate
prices and halted new construction. This urban roller coaster at
different periods, across areas of the world, illustrates both the
dependence and vulnerability of any locale, including major cities, to
changing global flows.” 109 This might indicate a sort of business-elitedriven “cosmopolitanism” rather than a truly global and popular
phenomenon. However, Castells convincingly demonstrates that, while
New York, Shanghai, and Madrid are truly global cities in themselves in
ways that Omaha, Nebraska, is not, Omaha is linked intimately in the
“network” through its relation to more “local” Chicago or New York.
Omaha might not be a global city in the way that New York is, but its
fate is determined, at least in part, by global economic developments. 110

105. Id.
106. Id. at 80.
107. MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF NETWORK SOCIETY 39–40 (1996). Castells points out,
“The average cost of processing information fell from around $75 per million operations in 1960 to less
than one-hundredth of a cent in 1990.” Id. at 45. This remarkable development of information
technology was used to further accelerate the process of technological innovation. This helps account
for the pervasiveness and rapidity of technological diffusion and development. Id. at 29–68.
108. Id. at 151.
109. Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 378–86. Castells argues that while the megacities like New York, London, and
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This realization has important consequences, because, as Castells points
out, the increasing interconnectedness and interrelation of the global
economy has seriously damaging effects on those who are excluded.
Those outside of the global network are profoundly affected by it
because of their exclusion. 111
Mass media accompanied and helped to create this global network.
Castells argues that the transformative impact of the multimedia world is
unique because of the ease of access and interaction for individuals, and
the extreme difficulty of any power structure (nation or otherwise) to
censor or control the flow of information. 112 Furthermore, the global
mass media allows “cultural products . . . to circulate on every continent.
No state is disconnected completely from global telecommunications
networks.” 113 This interconnectedness has resulted in the rise of
“deterritorialization,” where culture, formerly tied to the local or
regional level, exists instead in the abstract. 114
Professor Arjun Appadurai has compared the role of the mass media
in the formation of a global identity to the importance of print capitalism
in the formation of national identity put forth in Benedict Anderson’s
Imagined Communities. 115 The development of this ubiquitous global
media network has induced “an integration of all messages in a common
cognitive pattern.” 116 Just as the rise of print capitalism provided the
impetus for breaking down social barriers created by the widespread
variation of language, the rise of the global media is moving beyond
language to allow communication and the exchange of ideas in a format
that can be understood without the written or spoken word. 117 Thus,
“more people than ever before seem to imagine routinely the possibility

Shanghai are likely to retain their influence as command and control nodes on the network, the network
is defined by its ability to quickly adapt, thus leading to a great deal of variability depending on shifting
global conditions.
111. Id. at 133; see also ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE 55 (1996) (“Where insulation
from the larger world seems to have been successful and where the role of the global imagination is
withheld from ordinary people (in places like Albania, North Korea, and Burma), what seems to appear
instead is a bizarre state-sponsored realism, which always contains within it the possibility of the
genocidal and totalizing lunacies of a Pol Pot or of long-repressed desires for critique or exit, as are
emerging in Albania and Myanmar (Burma).”).
112. CASTELLS, supra note 107, at 341, 352.
113. HELD ET AL., supra note 99, at 427.
114. A.D. Smith, Towards a Global Culture?, in GLOBAL CULTURE:
NATIONALISM,
GLOBALIZATION AND MODERNITY 177 (Mike Featherstone ed., 1990); see also Jan Aart Scholte, What
is ‘Global’ about Globalization?, in HELD ET AL., supra note 99, at 84.
115. APPADURAI, supra note 111, at 8.
116. CASTELLS, supra note 107, at 371 (emphasis in original).
117. See id. at 371; see also APPADURAI, supra note 111, at 194; ULF HANNERZ, TRANSNATIONAL
CONNECTIONS: CULTURE, PEOPLE, PLACES 21 (1996).
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that they or their children will live and work in places other than where
they were born.” 118 In addition, and more importantly for the purposes
of this Article, Appadurai asserts that the reach of mass media allows
previously unconnected peoples to begin to “imagine and feel things
together.” 119 This ability to experience, believe, imagine, or feel things
together has led to the rise of international organization of peoples
across political boundaries in order to pursue common political,
economic, or ideological goals. 120
Akira Iriye has found that the marked increase in the number of
international organizations suggests the development of a global
community that identifies itself, at least in part, by connections and
concerns that stretch across local and national boundaries. 121 According
to Iriye:
For both intergovernmental organizations and international nongovernmental organizations to emerge, nations and peoples had to be
strongly aware that they shared certain interests and objectives across . . .
national boundaries and that they could best solve their many problems
by pooling their resources and effecting transnational cooperation. 122

Iriye traces this development to the late nineteenth century, but
clearly indicates that the movement has gained momentum in recent
decades. For example, the number of intergovernmental organizations
grew from 280 to 1,530 between 1972 and 1984, while the number of
international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) increased from
2,795 to 12,686 during the same period. 123 Thus, the increasingly
international organization of peoples across political boundaries in order
to pursue common political, economic, or ideological goals evidences
the development of an increasingly imagined global community. 124
Globalization has produced a transnational public sphere that can

118. APPADURAI, supra note 111, at 6.
119. Id. at 8.
120. See Martin Kohler, From the National to the Cosmopolitan Public Sphere, in RE-IMAGINING
POLITICAL COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 231 (Daniele Archibugi et al. eds.,
1998). Many authors have articulated this phenomenon. See, e.g., APPADURAI, supra note 111, at 167–
68.
121. AKIRA IRIYE, GLOBAL COMMUNITY: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 8 (2002).
122. Id. at 9.
123. Id. at 129. Iriye points out that the numbers are even more staggering if one includes the
number of local offices rather than just headquarters (7,073 intergovernmental organizations and 79,786
international NGOs).
124. See Kohler, supra note 120, at 231. Surely, the exponential growth of multinational
corporations adds to this interconnectedness across national boundaries. See also supra note 1 and
accompanying text.
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form the basis for a new global, social, and cultural solidarity.125
Building on the work of Jürgen Habermas, Craig Calhoun suggests that
the notion of a global community engaged and linked through the
rational discussion of common problems, though helpful, produces “thin
identities” that would be unlikely to provide sufficient cohesive force for
its members in times of crises. 126
Calhoun goes on to suggest, however, that in order to build a lasting
solidarity, the global community must move beyond the mere
recognition of overlapping interests and begin to engage in “shared
projects of imagining a better future.” 127 He argues that the thin veneer
of unity provided by a shared economic program can do little to
substitute for shared notions of global humanity produced by “cultural
creativity” and “mutual engagement.” 128
Modern economic, political, and technological realities have created a
globalized community of necessity. The cultural exchange that has
accompanied these developments has reduced the centrality of location
and territory to the formation of identity. The growing ubiquity of the
mass media and its transcendence of language through the development
of integrated audio-visual imagery are helping to produce an imagined
community on a global scale. The transnational public sphere provides
an existing framework to further develop the growing ties between the
world’s peoples.
Philosophers, starting with the Stoics and leading to a number of the
liberal philosophers including Kant, Locke, and Rawls, have been cited
for evidence of cosmopolitanism. 129 As discussed herein, Habermas,130
Anderson, Appadurai, Appiah, Castells, and Calhoun, among a litany of
others, argue that globalization has produced a transnational public
sphere that can form the basis for a new global, social, and cultural
solidarity. 131 Modern economic, political, and technological realities
have created a globalized community of choice, clearly, but also one of
necessity—one that requires us to engage in projects that help us not just
imagine a better future but also work toward securing that better future.
125. Craig Calhoun, Imagining Solidarity: Cosmopolitanism, Constitutional Patriotism, and the
Public Sphere, 14 PUBLIC CULTURE 1, 147 (2002).
126. Id. at 157.
127. Id. at 171.
128. Id.
129. Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitan Patriots, 23 CRITICAL INQUIRY 617, 619–20 (1997);
Hugh Harris, The Greek Origins of the Idea of Cosmopolitanism, 38 INT’L J. ETHICS 1, 8–9 (1927);
Martha C. Nussbaum, Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism, 5 J. POL. PHIL. 1, 4–7 (1997).
130. See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, The European Nation-State and the Pressures of Globalization,
NEW LEFT REVIEW, I/235, May–June 1999, 58, 46–59, available at http://www.newleftreview.net.
131. Calhoun, supra note 125, at 147.
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The idea that our identities are no longer tied exclusively to one
nation is convincing. Anthony Appiah, however, cautions against an
imperialistic, deracinating form of cosmopolitanism. 132
Heeding
Appiah’s caution, this Article argues that our identities are both personal
and local, both local and national, both national and cosmopolitan: that
at least some small aspect of each of us is now cosmopolitan. This
Article
adopts
the
framework
Appiah
calls
“Rooted
Cosmopolitanism.” 133
Appiah has described the task of formulating the theory of Rooted
Cosmopolitanism as a compromise between thick and thin identities. 134
Building on the work of Ronald Dworkin, Appiah analogizes the
distinction between morality (what we owe others) and ethics (what kind
of life is good for us to live) to the distinction between thick identities
and thin identities. 135 Thus, while we may have thick identities based on
our close relationships with others or our membership in a particular
community, this does not obviate the thin identities that result from our
desire and necessity for a well-ordered society. Rather, these identities
impose dual loyalties that are not mutually exclusive, and are often
blurred. 136
Appiah describes the conflict between nationalists and cosmopolitans
as resting largely on the perceived incompatibility of these dual
loyalties. He argues that the thick nationalist identity that recognizes
and praises “special responsibilities” trouble cosmopolitanism because it
apparently disrupts the development of a universal morality. At the
same time, cosmopolitanism bothers nationalists because universal
morality allegedly undermines the role of “special responsibilities.” 137
However, as Appiah demonstrates, defenders of both cosmopolitan and
nationalist ideologies have praised the duty owed to a universal
humanity while simultaneously arguing that local action is the best way
to further the goal of making the world a better place. 138 In this respect,

132. KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 214 (2005).
133. Id. “Rooted Cosmopolitanism” is the title of the last chapter of The Ethics of Identity.
134. Id. at 230.
135. Id. at 231.
136. Id. at 233–36.
137. Id. at 239.
138. Id. at 240. “Making the world a better place,” though not used explicitly in this passage,
serves as a theme for the entire chapter. Appiah introduces the chapter by describing his father’s dying
words that as a citizen of the world, he had a duty to leave it better than he found it. Appiah uses his
personal history (English mother, Ghanian nationalist father) to serve as a backdrop for the idea that
nationalism and cosmopolitanism are not mutually exclusive. Rather, he sees them as sharing
intellectual foundations in that both involve “imagined communities” and the appeal for a more
universal identity.
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Appiah endorses Michael Ignatieff’s comment that “human rights has
gone global by going local.” 139 Thus, one can be, at once, a local,
national, and cosmopolitan citizen.
Having recognized these disputes between nationalism and
cosmopolitanism, Appiah seeks to find a common ground that can
accommodate both special responsibilities and universalism. He
contends that the “basic human capacity to grasp stories, even strange
stories, is also what links us, powerfully, to others, even strange
others.” 140
Cosmopolitanism presupposes the value of learning from different
opinions, stories, and experiences. Even if those differences do not
eventually lead to agreement, they can lead to understanding. 141 This is
the essential goal of Rooted Cosmopolitanism:
interaction and
discussion between “others,” even “strange others,” in the hopes of
leaving the world a better place. 142
David Beetham argues that the international human rights regime
provides a template for the development of a cosmopolitan democracy,
and claims that the human rights regime actually functions as a
democratic institution currently. He indicates that both human rights
and democracy are universal values. Though he recognizes that there is
a major weakness in the human rights system (the absence of any
effective enforcement mechanism), Beetham contends that international
human rights organizations have created a sort of international public
forum where national governments can be held accountable in the court
of international public opinion. Furthermore, he suggests that seemingly
innocuous international treaties can have a dynamic that “drags member
states along despite themselves” (presumably through the creation of
CIL). 143
Theoretical and empirical work on cosmopolitan identities is most
active in the social sciences, as evidenced by the foregoing discussion.
Legal scholarship, especially international legal scholarship, has
incorporated these ideas as well. For example, in Human Rights and
World Public Order, Myers McDougal stated: “The existence of a
world community, in the sense of the long-term interdetermination of all
individuals with regard to all values today is commonly recognized.” 144

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 260.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 271.
Id.
David Beetham, Human Rights as a Model for Cosmopolitan Democracy?, in REIMAGINING
POLITICAL COMMUNITY 58, 65 (Daniele Archibugi et al. eds., 1998).
144. MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 52, at 94.
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Linda Bosniak, in Citizenship Denationalized, provides the argument
that it is both desirable and empirically supportable to discuss the
development and emergence of a type of global citizenship. 145 She
realistically emphasizes that national identities and nation-states are not
going to disappear in the foreseeable future, but recognizes that scholars
have made a convincing argument for the development of identities that
transcend national boundaries.
First, Bosniak inquires whether an emerging “postnational” or
“transnational” community exists. She recognizes the same issues raised
by Beetham: that the international human rights regime has some claim
to this sort of community. She also points to arguments that resemble
those of Iriye and Habermas: that there is an increased global activism
that looks and acts like a global civil society. This political activity, she
argues, is one component of citizenship. She also discusses citizenship
in terms of “identity/solidarity,” echoing many of the social and cultural
theorists discussed in this Article. Having identified these arguments in
favor of emerging global communities, Bosniak questions whether these
new identities should be encapsulated in the term “citizenship.”
Bosniak concludes by indicating that the term “citizenship” is
important because it is a “powerful expressive term, one which conveys
honor and recognition upon the social and political practices to which it
is applied. The debate over the term’s scope of application is,
consequently, a debate over the scope and extent of recognition we will
accord various nonnational forms of collective life.” 146 She concludes
that emerging global identities exist, and that describing those identities
as “citizenship” represents an essentially ideological choice to advocate
for further development of these transnational identities.
VI. CHANGING LAW TO ACCOMMODATE CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES
If we take seriously the idea that individuals have become at least
partially cosmopolitan, and that society and citizenship has palpably
changed in the face of globalization, it is appropriate to think about how
law ought to respond to this changed circumstance. That this rethinking
is well underway is without debate, as indicated by the proliferation of
literature struggling with new or changing forms of governance. 147

145. Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2000).
146. Id. at 509.
147. See, e.g., Nancy Viviani, Regional Arrangements and Democratic Reform of the United
Nations, in BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THE UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE
AND CIVIL SOCIETY 312 (Albert J. Paolini et al. eds. 1998) (stating that in the emergence of post-Cold
War governments, “we are witnessing the transformation of traditional state structures, the rise of new
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If, as so many scholars assert, individuals are now at least partly
cosmopolitan, there is something amiss in the lack of participation
individuals have in the process of forming the CIL of human rights. The
structure provided in brief by Lung-chu Chen for evaluating the role of
the individual in international law is helpful here. 148
A. Individuals and International Law
Chen’s function-oriented framework is highly instructive, as it reveals
the uncomfortable disjuncture in international law that this Article aims
to elucidate and attempts to address. The functions filled by either
states, individuals, or both in international law under Professor Chen’s
framework are the following: prescribing, applying, providing
information (intelligence), invocation, and appraisal. 149
Professor Chen has suggested that the international law functions in
which states continue to occupy the prominent role are those of
prescribing and applying the law. Individuals play important functions
in other areas such as providing information or “intelligence,” promoting
international law, invoking the law, and making appraisals thereof. 150
However, Professor Chen also notes, and this Article concurs, that
these traditional conceptions of the functions of individuals and states
are not so neatly separated. For example, individuals have long had a
role in the prescription and application of international law. The
creation of custom “through the widely congruent patterns of people’s
behavior and other communications” has served as a contribution to the
prescribing function. 151 In addition, to “invoke the authoritative
application of transnational prescriptions, individuals have had and
continue to have access to national courts; they are increasingly afforded
access to transnational arenas of authority, notably in the field of human
rights protection.” 152

regions detached from global institutions, the erosion of the influence of global governments including
the UN and the renewed importance of social, economic and political movements within and across
states”); see also ART OF THE STATE: GOVERNANCE IN A WORLD WITHOUT FRONTIERS (Thomas J.
Courchene & Donald J. Savoie eds. 2003) (analyzing policy challenges presented by globalization as
they relate to Canada); GLOBALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE (Ann Marie Bissessar ed. 2004) (discussing
the implications of globalization on the governance of small states such as Barbados, Trinidad, and the
Caribbean states).
148. CHEN, supra note 78, at 76–81.
149. Id. at 80.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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B. Individuals and Human Rights
The literature on human rights treaties often refers to the fundamental
shift that has occurred within international law as a result of human
rights treaties. Individuals rather than states are the subjects of these
treaties. 153 Human rights treaties address the rights of individuals under
international law rather than the rights of states thereunder. As
mentioned previously, individuals are seen as stakeholders in human
rights treaties and the issues addressed thereby, and are thus provided
with opportunities to participate in the treaty formation process.154
Similarly, treaty definition and interpretation continue to be informed
through individual engagement with treaties after they have been signed
and entered into force. This engagement occurs through the activities of
NGOs, or through the petitioning process available to individuals under
the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, or through the individual
petitioning rights available under the European, American, and now the
African systems for human rights. 155 Thus, there is general agreement
that the last fifty years have seen a paradigm shift in international treaty
law such that the individual is now both a subject and an agent under the
treaty component of international law. CIL and, specifically for the
purposes of this Article, the CIL of human rights has recognized no such
paradigm shift. Perhaps it should.
C. Individuals and the CIL of Human Rights
The CIL of human rights, no less than treaty law, has direct effects on
individuals. It sees them as the subjects addressed by those provisions
that have attained the status of CIL. Unlike treaty law, though, there is
no space in the traditional formulation of CIL for individual
participation in the CIL formation process. As a result, there is currently
an uncomfortable disjuncture in the CIL of human rights. Individuals
are its subjects but are not seen as legitimate participants in its
formation. The chart that follows employs the functions-oriented
framework described earlier to illustrate this incongruence. 156
153. The author would like to note that she acknowledges Professor Chen’s discomfort with this
use of subject/object terminology and expresses sympathy with his discomfort. They are used here
because, despite their clumsiness, they are helpful in thinking about the gaps in traditional thinking
about international law.
154. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
155. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
34, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221; The American Convention on Human Rights art. 44, July 18, 1978,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 46, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58.
156. For a brief discussion of these functions, see supra notes 147–52 and accompanying text.
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CIL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
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States and Individuals 157
States and Individuals
States and Individuals

This traditional state-centric conception of CIL, at least within the CIL
of human rights, is incongruent with models of participatory democracy.
Robert Dahl, a modern political theorist, advances five criteria that
are satisfied in a fully functioning democracy: first, there is voting
equality—each person may express his or her preferences; second,
citizens have adequate opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking
process; third, citizens’ preferences are informed or enlightened; fourth,
the citizens set the agenda—they control the matters that are decided
through the democratic process; and fifth, all adult residents are included
in the citizenry. 158 These criteria rest on a few assumptions, including
the assumption that decisions binding on a group of people (e.g., a
citizenry) should be made by members of that group. 159 While scholars
debate the issue of who may be included in the citizenry, 160 there seems
to be agreement that democracy is defined as a “government by the
many—not by single rulers or by small oligarchies,” and that it requires
“active, possibly continual participation of large sectors of the
population in the political process.” 161 A functioning democracy
requires the active and direct participation of individuals. Furthermore,
a representative form of government does not diminish the claim that

157. Though individuals have been included here, the only individuals afforded a role in providing
intelligence for CIL under the traditional formulation are “the most highly qualified jurists.”
International lawyers sometimes also describe as “sources” the “judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,” mentioned in
Article 38(1) (d) of the Statute of the Court, supra. Those, however, are not sources in
the same sense since they are not ways in which law is made or accepted, but opinionevidence as to whether some rule has in fact become or been accepted as international
law.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS § 102 (1987) and Reporters Note 1.
158. ROBERT A. DAHL, TOWARD DEMOCRACY: A JOURNEY 61–88 (1997).
159. Id. at 59.
160. See, e.g., id. at 68–88 (arguing against the aristocratic or meritocratic view that only those
with a high degree of knowledge and virtue ought to govern).
161. S.N. EISENSTADT, PARADOXES OF DEMOCRACY: FRAGILITY, CONTINUITY, AND CHANGE 7
(1999).
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democracy requires individual participation. 162
It should be noted that, while political theorists disagree over the
extent of involvement citizens ought to have in political
decisionmaking, 163 participatory democracy theorists believe that
citizens should be directly involved in making political decisions:
“The crucial issue of democracy is not the composition of the elite . . . .
Instead the issue is whether democracy can diffuse power sufficiently
throughout society to inculcate among people of all walks of life a
justifiable feeling that they have the power to participate in decisions
which affect themselves and the common life of the community.” 164

Each of Dahl’s five criteria are useful in parsing what is meant by
democratic participation. This Article is not interested so much in
voting rights and democratic participation as it is in other means by
which individuals can participate in society—simply put, this Article is
more concerned with theories of participatory democracy. Dahl’s
second and third criteria are particularly of interest here.
In a fully functioning democracy, citizens have adequate opportunity
to participate in the decisionmaking process. It is admittedly difficult to
conceive of the CIL formation process as democratic. However, this
need not be as difficult as it has been to date. Among the major
difficulties when trying to picture CIL formation as democratic is the
fact that a vast number of individuals would need an opportunity to
participate. This Article does not purport to state how each and every
adult individual would be consulted as to particular provisions of the
CIL of human rights. Pragmatically and politically, any such attempt
may be difficult to achieve. Rather, this Article simply asserts that if we
have a choice between allowing individual participation for those

162. ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 159–61 (2001).
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution realized that America could not be governed by a “direct
democracy” in the sense of all the people coming together to enact laws. Instead, a representative form
of government, which Madison called a republic, would be needed. This republic government,
according to Madison, would “‘derive[] all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the
people,’” and it would be “‘administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, or for a
limited period, or during good behavior.’” Thus, even in a representative government, individual
participation is still required. Id.
163. Donald W. Keim, Participation in Contemporary Democratic Theories, in PARTICIPATION IN
POLITICS 1, 9 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1975).
164. Id. at 10 (quoting PETER BACHRACH, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELITISM 92 (1967)). At
the other end of the spectrum, revisionist theorists argue that citizens do not need to play a direct role:
“The task of the citizen in revisionist theory is to assess regime performance and to register preferences.
This is generally accomplished by indirect means.” Id. at 9. At the other end of the spectrum, the
assessment of these theories and the examination of theories lying between these extremes is beyond the
scope of this Article. It can be said at this point, however, that it seems that all agree that individual
participation—either directly or indirectly—is an essential requirement to democracy.
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affected by the CIL of human rights, the choice ought to be in favor of
increased individual participation.
Dahl also states that, in a fully functioning democracy, citizens’
preferences are informed and enlightened. This Article explains the
necessity of a fully functioning judiciary to ensure active and informed
dialogue on important legal issues. The judiciary serves a crucial role in
starting and informing dialogue among a citizenry. The active discourse
over the separations of powers concerning whether courts may interpret
and utilize foreign and international law provides an excellent example
of the courts’ power to stimulate such conversation. The courts’ power
to promote dialogue is perhaps even more evident when a court makes a
controversial decision regarding individual rights. 165 Once again, if we
can choose between facilitating the judiciary’s role in protecting the
democratic process through stimulating dialogue or, alternatively,
disavowing such a role, the choice ought to be to encourage courts to
create dialogue.
McDougal’s observations of a wide diversity and great abundance of
communication processes by which norms are created in the
contemporary world do not weaken this assertion. 166 McDougal
describes the various methods by which individuals currently participate
in communicating expectations and experiences regarding matters
including policy, authority, and control. He states, “it is a process of
communication in this comprehensive sense which creates and maintains
the contemporary human rights prescriptions.” 167
McDougal’s observation is consistent with Habermas’s model of
participatory and deliberative democracy, which asserts that legitimate
lawmaking arises from the process of active deliberation among the
subjects of law. 168 It is also consistent with Rousseau’s view that direct,
or deliberative, democracy was the only route to true freedom, as it
allows individuals the ability to participate in making the laws to which
they are subject. 169
In a representative democratic society, few avenues exist for direct,
individual participation in lawmaking. Still, this Article submits that the
emerging condition of cosmopolitanism presses us to rethink the CIL of

165. Examples abound, including controversies surrounding the pledge of allegiance, enemy
detainees, gay marriage, abortion rights, and capital punishment. For a further discussion of this idea,
see infra Part VII.
166. MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 52, at 264.
167. Id.
168. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 318 (1996).
169. See POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: THEORIES, THINKERS, CONCEPTS 358 (Seymour Martin Lipset
ed., 2001).
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human rights such that individuals become not only the subjects of that
law but also agents in its formation. There are few venues available for
individual engagement with CIL, but the ATCA serves as one of those
spaces. This makes it unusual and perhaps it is among the reasons it
attracts so much interest and controversy.
The process of
democratization, after all, is rarely contested.
VII. THE ROLE OF COURTS
Current discourse about CIL does battle over the proper role of
federal courts in interpreting CIL. Some revisionist CIL scholars argue
that federal courts are prohibited from interpreting CIL. 170 A position
that seeks to limit the channels through which individuals can engage
with CIL is, within the framework of participatory democracy and
cosmopolitanism, an anti-democratic position. The project, instead,
ought to be to increase sites of individual engagement with CIL. The
claim of this Article is not that the judiciary is better equipped than the
executive or the legislature to engage with CIL. Those are fine
institutions—democratic in their nature as well—and fine sites for
individuals’ indirect participation in the CIL formation process. But the
judiciary is part of the democratic model and ought not be excluded as
proposed by some scholars who focus on the problems CIL might pose
for American constitutional democracy in isolation.
As Paul Diamond and others have suggested, an essential role of the
judicial branch is to promote dialogue. As we see during every Supreme
Court term, controversial decisions promote heated discourse over the
most pressing and controversial legal and political issues. Under this
view, when a court issues an opinion, we either come to accept the
court’s decision, or the court’s opinion will mutate and change over time
such that legal rules promulgated by the court come to fit more closely
with our general conscience about what the law ought to be. Diamond
sees court rulings not as final judgments but as provisional rulings that
foster an ongoing dialogue with the people. 171 Accordingly, rather than
ending public debate, court decisions actually help to decentralize and
democratize the debate.
The proliferation of literature on the ATCA and on substantive claims
made thereunder certainly seems to substantiate Diamond’s theory of
provisional review. The amicus briefs filed in connection with the Sosa
170. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 10. This view is also present among Supreme Court
Justices. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171. PAUL R. DIAMOND, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL CHOICE: THE ROLE OF
PROVISIONAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 155 (1989).
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litigation came from a variety of foreign sources such as the European
Union, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Swiss Confederation, and
others. Other briefs were submitted by international interest groups
including foreign legal scholars, the World Jewish Congress, and
international jurists. After the decision, a quick search of international
news stories related to the Sosa opinion provided ample evidence that
the world is watching and talking about the ATCA. Simply put, without
the ATCA and litigation thereunder, international awareness and
discourse about human rights, corporate social responsibility, and CIL
would all be impoverished.
Eliminating the ATCA or limiting its availability to plaintiffs through
a substantive limitation of CIL or by claiming that application of CIL by
federal judges is undemocratic will similarly diminish individual
participation in the formation of CIL. At a time when a significant
criticism of international law is that it is not democratic enough, 172 we
ought not try to eviscerate the few tools available for such participation.
Platforms such as the ATCA, which allow individuals the opportunity to
engage with CIL and proliferate the potential sources to which one looks
in making a determination about whether a particular right has attained
the status of CIL, also have the potential benefit of mitigating the stateaction-versus-state-words problem that has plagued CIL and fascinated
legal scholars. But expounding on this is best left for another time.

172. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld stating:
The antidemocratic qualities of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and other international governance organizations—their centralization, their
opacity, their remoteness from popular or representative politics, their elitism, their
unaccountability—are well known. . . . World government in the absence of world
democracy is necessarily technocratic, bureaucratic, diplomatic—everything but
democratic. . . .
....
. . . What sets [America’s] teeth on edge [are] . . . binding agreements administered,
interpreted, and enforced by multilateral bodies. . . . America’s commitment to
democratic self-government gives the United States good reason to be skeptical about—
indeed, to resist—international legal regimes structured . . . around antinationalist and
antidemocratic principles.
Reprinted in Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1492, 1497 (2004). See also Eric Stein, International Integration an Democracy: No Love at First
Sight, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 489 (2001) (using the examples of the GATT/WTO system, NAFTA, and the
European Union to demonstrate the democratic deficit to which many have pointed in the face of
international integration).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
It is important to clarify that the substantive human rights provisions
that have attained the status of CIL may not change under this Article’s
proposal.
In the near term, the short list provided by the
Restatement 173 —genocide,
slavery,
extra-judicial
killing,
disappearances, and torture or inhuman treatment—would probably not
be supplemented, depleted, or altered. This is probably the way things
ought to be.
Especially in light of the requirements set forth in Sosa that claims
under the ATCA be predicated on norms that are definable or specific,
universal, and obligatory, the CIL of human rights is one of those spaces
where “we do not go wrong here if we resist designating everything we
should devoutly hope for a ‘fundamental right.’” 174 Certainly an
argument that CIL should be formed at least partially through the direct
participation of individuals depends on a modest vision of which rights
currently have attained and are likely to attain the status of CIL. For
example, any right that has been at the center of conversations about
cultural relativism will not likely become a right as a matter of CIL in
the immediate or short-term future. A number of rights enumerated in
human rights treaties also would likely not make the list. There is
simply not agreement amongst the people of the civilized world about
the status of these norms. It is beyond the scope of this Article to
determine, as an empirical matter, which of the rights enumerated in the
UDHR, the ICCPR, the ICESCR, or any of the other human rights
treaties would be affected by official recognition of the importance of
individual participation in CIL formation. However, it seems unlikely
173. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
174. APPIAH, supra note 129, at 266. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1993); see also Mary Ann Glendon, Foundations of
Human Rights: The Unfinished Business, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (1999) (arguing against the proliferation of
the calls for “new” international human rights). Glendon contends that part of the genius of the original
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was its recognition of the cultural plurality of the United
Nations’ member states and its thus deliberate avoidance of codifying overarching theoretical or
philosophical principles, instead couching the rights in ambiguous and general terms in order to provide
for agreement on central concepts while providing enough room for interpretation. Glendon also
displays hostility at the proliferation of calls for new rights, decrying the “trivialization of core freedoms
by special interests posing as new rights.” Id. at 8. For Glendon, efforts to add to the list of rights by
calling for new, specific rights undermines the widespread agreement ushered in the ambiguity of the
original UDHR. Phillip Alston has registered similar concerns. See Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New
Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 607, 609 (1984) (fearing that calls
for new rights will undermine the established credibility of existing rights). In contrast to the rights set
forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Alston notes that vigorous discussion and analysis
have been absent from calls for new rights, leading to an “inordinate vagueness.” Id. at 613–14.
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that the list of human rights that compose the CIL of human rights
would change significantly from the currently agreed upon list under the
proposal set forth in this Article.
Rather than suggest an expansion, contraction, or modification of the
substantive norms that make up the CIL of human rights, this Article has
attempted to convey the need to democratize the CIL formation process
in order to afford the individual a participatory role in CIL formation.
This democratization alone seems a worthwhile pursuit.
The natural question then becomes “how would the individual
participate?” As has been suggested in this Article, a provisional
response is that the individual, in very limited instances, already
participates through mechanisms like the ATCA.
Making the
paradigmatic or procedural shift proposed herein may help the ATCA
appear less anomalous or dangerous—as something that ought to be
protected and propagated, rather than stifled, limited, or eliminated.

